Alain de Benoist on Globalization

The following is a transcript from a speech given at an anti-globalization conference in Antwerp in 2003. Benoist argues that globalization is a dominant and irreversible force, driven by the expansion of electronic and communication technologies and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The spread of capitalism, particularly the dominance of the market and the pursuit of constant profit, is central to this process, leading to the homogenization of cultures and lifestyles worldwide.

Translated by Alexander Raynor

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On Globalization

The term "globalization" (or "mondialization") has become prevalent in recent years to describe a phenomenon unfolding before our eyes: the deterritorialization of most contemporary issues and the trend toward the unification of the Earth. This phenomenon is not an idea or a mere project, but a reality to which most current trends objectively contribute. The scale of the phenomenon suggests its long duration. Globalization, in other words, now constitutes the framework of our present history. This is why declaring oneself "against globalization" no longer makes much sense. However, one can clarify its meaning and attempt to influence its forms and content.

Two factors have played a key role in the advent of globalization. On the one hand, the rise of electronics and communication technologies, which have enabled the establishment of networks spanning the entire surface of the Earth. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet system, which, since the end of World War II, had served as a kind of counterbalance to the expansion of American power. This does not mean, of course, that the disappearance of communism should be regretted. In politics, it is not uncommon for a harm to arise from a good (or the reverse). This is what Max Weber referred to as the paradox of consequences. With globalization, the Earth does not unify just any old way. It tends to unify in the form of a market, that is, under the sole horizon of the commodity logic and the pursuit of constant profit increases. The advent of a global market is accompanied by a transformation in mentalities. The internalization of the market model establishes, both in minds and behaviors, the primacy of market values. Most areas that previously somewhat escaped the logic of capital (art, culture, sport, education, etc.) are now fully integrated into it. The anthropological model now dominant is a utilitarian one: man is defined as an individual primarily concerned with producing and (especially) consuming, as an economic agent who is supposed to constantly seek to maximize his best interest. Thus, society moves from having a market to being a market society. But it goes without saying that the development of exchanges does not eliminate alienation or harm: the only demand that the market can address is solvent demand.

Therefore, it is not the "cosmopolitan" left, but the liberal right, that has realized or allowed globalization. It corresponds to the centuries-old tendency of capitalism: by definition, the market has no boundaries other than itself. The observation that capitalism has proven more effective than communism in realizing the "internationalist ideal" is therefore only seemingly paradoxical. Historically, "cosmopolitanism" has mostly been expressed on the left, but today it is not left-wing parties, but rather right-wing parties, that most actively promote globalization. Those who criticize globalization without saying anything about the Capital-Form would be better off remaining silent.

What are the effects of globalization? The most obvious one lies in the extension and realization of what I would call the ideology of the Same: global homogenization, uniformity of behaviors, the disappearance of differentiated ways of life, the generalization of a uniform model of "development," etc. This homogenization, which means that from one end of the Earth to the other, people increasingly consume the same products, watch the same shows, live in cities designed according to the same model, etc., is supported by implicit propaganda that aims to discredit any alternative model. The general idea constantly hammered by politicians as well as the media is that we live, not in the best of all possible worlds, but in a world that, though imperfect, is still preferable to any other. At the same time, we see the establishment of control procedures that also extend globally — and in which we can see the early signs of a kind of planetary Panopticon: the advent of a society of total surveillance. Finally, this homogenization generalizes a particular model, the Western economic and technological model, now presented as the inevitable "destiny" of all cultures. Globalization thus largely coincides with a Westernization, of which American power is currently the main driving force.

However, it is important to also note the dialectical nature of globalization. This dialectic represents its main contradiction. To the extent that globalization appears, not without reason, as the unilateral imposition of the Western way of life, it provokes strong "identity" resistance everywhere in the world. The more globalization actualizes unification, the more it potentiates fragmentation; the more it actualizes the global, the more it potentiates the local. One could, of course, rejoice in this. However, if globalization destroys and resurrects identities in the same movement, those it makes reappear are not the same. Globalization eliminates organic, balanced identities and restores them in a purely reactive, even convulsive form. This is the phenomenon that Benjamin Barber summarized in one phrase: "Jihad vs. McWorld."¹

Globalization also brings about the abolition of time and space. The abolition of time results from the fact that, thanks to instantaneous information and communication technologies, everything now happens and spreads in "zero time": the same events (whether it is the September 11 attacks in the United States or the World Cup final) are seen and "experienced" at the same moment by viewers around the world, financial flows are transmitted instantly from one end of the Earth to the other, etc. As for the abolition of space, it stems from the fact that borders no longer stop anything, so no territory has any particular centrality.

During the Cold War, there was a border between the communist world and what was then boldly called the "free world." Today, there is no longer a border. Information, programs, financial flows, goods, and even people, move more and more freely from one country to another or are distributed simultaneously in all countries. Within each country, the distinction between inside and outside no longer means anything. For example, in the past, the police were in charge of maintaining internal order, while the military handled external interventions. It is significant that today the police increasingly use military means, while the military engages in "international police operations." The rise of global neo-terrorism is also revealing: in the United States, the FBI and the CIA now have the same enemies. (To use the phrase cited earlier, it is no longer "Jihad vs. McWorld," but "Jihad in McWorld"). Thus, globalization marks the advent of a world without an outside. The neologism "globalitarianism" was coined to describe this world that has nothing above it, this global grip that is by nature unbounded.

The advent of globalization also corresponds to the end of modernity. The fall of the Berlin Wall, to take that landmark, not only marked the end of the post-war era or the end of the 20th century. It also represented the entry into postmodernity.

In the postmodern world, all political forms inherited from modernity become obsolete. Political life no longer consists merely of party competition. The "Leninist" model, in which parties sought to gain power to implement their program, is largely outdated, as the scope for action of governments is shrinking more every day. Nation-states lose both their centrality and their legitimacy. Their centrality because they are now too large to meet the daily needs of people, but at the same time too small to address the global spread of issues and constraints. Their legitimacy because the institutional crucibles of integration on which they once relied (schools, the military, unions, parties, etc.) have all gone into crisis one after the other, and they are no longer creators of social cohesion. Social bonds are thus being reconstituted outside of administrative authorities and overarching institutions. Globalization causes a divorce between meaning and symbol, leading to a generalized desymbolization of political life. The crisis of representation, the rise of abstention in elections, the flourishing of populism and new social movements, are other characteristic symptoms of this evolution.

We are simultaneously witnessing the end of nation-states in favor of communities and continents, the end of mass organizations in favor of networks, the end of the model of explosion/revolution in favor of that of implosion/dispersion, the end of territorial logics in favor of transnational logics, and the end of solitary individualism in favor of the intersubjectivity of groups.

The globalized world is above all a world of networks. These networks associate individuals based on their affinities, opinions, or interests, without considering their proximity to each other in terms of territory. Their defining characteristic — which distinguishes them from other organizations — is that they have neither a center nor a periphery: every point in a network is both central and peripheral. Networks today come in all sorts: industrial and financial networks, information networks, criminal networks, terrorist networks, etc. Their mode of operation is essentially that of delocalization. Large multinational corporations, major industrial companies, drug cartels, neo-terrorist groups, and mafias all operate in exactly the same way: they choose the locations most suitable for their activities and move to other places whenever they find better conditions.

The disruptive logic of the network universe is a viral logic. There is much to say here about the paradigmatic nature of the virus model. It is no coincidence that the major infectious diseases most discussed today (AIDS, mad cow disease, etc.) are viral diseases. They spread in exactly the same way as viruses that are transmitted across the globe in computer networks. The virus is, above all, the disruptive element of the network.

These few considerations are enough to understand how futile it would be to try to identify a "conductor" of globalization. As it essentially consists of a multiplication of networks, globalization has neither center nor operator nor central command post. The American power, which is today the main vector of globalization because it is the only great world power, represents only a subordinate part of it. Just like finance or technology, globalization operates according to its own logic: a horizontal model, not a vertical one, "cybernetic," not controlled or commanded remotely. The cause of globalization’s development lies in its mere existence.

What can be done in the face of globalization? Since globalization tends to eradicate singular cultures and differentiated ways of life, it seems natural to oppose it with an identity-based claim. But if we want the word "identity" to be more than just a slogan, a fetish word, we must be fully aware of the difficulties it raises. Answering the question "Who am I?" is no easier for a community than for an individual. Identity is, in many ways, as much a problem as a solution. This becomes apparent as soon as we try to give it content: saying "I am French" or "I am German" still means nothing until we have substantively defined what it means to be French or German. Moreover, we must not forget that we live in an era where the sources of identity (cultural, religious, professional, sexual, etc.) are more numerous than ever. Prioritizing one over another is always arbitrary.

Let us recall a few essential principles on this matter. Firstly, identity is not a static notion, but a dynamic reality. Far from being defined by a more or less idealized past, it is a historical narration — a narration of the self — that continues at every present moment. On the other hand, it is not an essence, but a substance. It is not what never changes, but what allows one to remain oneself while constantly changing. Finally, it necessarily implies a relationship with the Other: one only constructs oneself in dialogue or confrontation with others.

Identities have lost their "natural" character today. Contemporary societies are no longer heteronomous societies, governed by principles or traditions considered self-evident by everyone. We have moved from heteronomy to autonomy, which means that we no longer have a foundation whose evidence imposes itself on its own. Every foundation is inevitably subject to critical examination. As a result, the distinction between inherited identities and chosen identities tends to fade. Even inherited identities are now chosen, insofar as they only become operative to the extent that one accepts or wishes to recognize oneself in them. Identity, therefore, is no longer synonymous with mere belonging. Belongings are diversified and may contradict each other. Recognizing oneself in a system of values, for example, may lead to opposing someone who shares the same belonging as we do but has chosen to recognize themselves in an opposing system. Finally, the identity of a community is no longer guaranteed by its presence or grouping on a given territory. Globalization marks the end of territorial identities, not of identities themselves.

Beyond the claim to identity, it seems essential to fight for the principle of diversity, which directly opposes the ideology of the Same. The goal is to counteract the homogenizing effect of globalization, to restore to humanity the plurality that constitutes its richness, and to ensure that it continues to be, not a uni-verse, but a pluri-verse.

Two important remarks should be made here. The first is that the global nature of globalization, which undeniably constitutes its strength, is also what, in a certain way, makes it weak. In a globalized world, everything resonates with everything else instantly. Nothing stops the spread of shockwaves, as we see with major financial crises that, when erupting anywhere on the planet, immediately have repercussions worldwide. The second remark is that the extension of networks, which is one of the most characteristic features of globalization, also represents one of the means to mitigate or combat its effects. Networks are a weapon. They allow dissident elements and rebels to gather from one end of the globe to the other and coordinate their actions. It is significant that anti-globalization movements themselves are globalized movements, as we saw in Seattle, Genoa, Porto Alegre, and elsewhere.

I have already said that nation-states are becoming increasingly incapable of addressing current issues, because they are now too large to solve daily problems and too small to control global situations on their own (the worldwide deployment of economic and financial powers, the satellite transmission of information programs, the global commercialization of new technologies, the management of ecological issues, transnational trafficking, etc.). This highlights the need for a reorganization of peoples and nations on the scale of large civilizational blocs and continents. It is only at this scale that one can hope to regain the control that isolated states have clearly lost.

But the same evolution also gives new importance to local action. Against global power, it would be perfectly futile to oppose another global power. The strategy of rupture, on the contrary, is to oppose the local to the global, the very small to the very large. In postmodernity, the balance of power has changed in nature. Fifty years ago, each power’s goal was to try to acquire means as important — and, if possible, more important — than those of the opposing power (the "balance of terror" during the Cold War). Today, conflicts are characterized more by the asymmetry of the forces involved, as was dramatically evident with the September 11 attacks. In the postmodern era, it is useless to fight globalization head-on. It is much more important to create autonomous communities, locally organized around common goals and shared values. The decline of nation-states frees up energy at the grassroots level. It favors local action possibilities and, by the same token, the reappearance of the political dimension of society. The application of the subsidiarity principle at all levels, which entails only letting matters that lower levels have no concrete expertise in rise to the top, would be one of the best ways to address the current content of globalization.

Is the phenomenon of globalization irreversible? In the long term, no answer is possible: by definition, history is always open. But for now, and very likely for the decades to come, globalization defines the world we are called to live in.

In such a perspective, we must avoid making a number of mistakes. One mistake would be to believe that it is still possible to escape the effects of globalization by retreating into oneself, calling for the preservation of identities in a purely ethnocentric sense. The "bunker logic" is no longer viable today, precisely because we are in a world where everything resonates with everything else. Disengaging from what happens elsewhere, thinking that it doesn’t concern us, prevents us from seeing that it precisely concerns us.

Another mistake would be to adopt a backward-looking perspective, merely trying to slow down dynamics that are already in motion. Right-wing movements, for at least a century, have specialized in lost causes. Lamenting the present situation by regretting the past leads nowhere. We can only fight by knowing how the battlefield is configured today — and how it will be configured tomorrow — not by dreaming of what it could be or by remembering what it once was. The goal is not to mistake the era we are in, that is, to be aware of the historical moment we are living through. It is to see what is coming, in order to determine what is possible.

Finally, I will conclude by saying that, to a certain extent, we must consider another globalization. Not a globalization oriented toward the homogeneous, toward the uniform spread of market values, not a globalization that marks the global victory of the Capital-Form, but a globalization based on the preservation of diversity (leaving to our descendants a world that is no less rich in differences than the one we inherited), the formation of large, self-centered continental spaces, the plurality of powers, local autonomy, participatory democracy (and no longer just representative democracy), and the principle of subsidiarity.

1. TN: Barber, Benjamin. Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy. Random House Publishing Group, 1996.